We analyze coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the identity of the members of the coalition they are members of. We study (coalition formation) rules that associate to each prole of agents' preferences a partition of the society. Our main interest is to devise rules that never provide incentives for the agents to misrepresent their preferences. Hence, we analyze strategy-proof rules in restricted domains of preferences as the domain of additively representable or separable preferences. In such restricted domains, we show that a family of rules {single-lapping rules{ are the only rules that fulll the requirements of strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and minimal exibility. Single-lapping rules are characterized by severe restrictions on the set of feasible coalitions. However, these rules always select core-stable partitions. Hence, our results highlight the relation between the non-cooperative concept of strategy-proofness and the cooperative concept of corestability. We also analyze the implications of our results to matching problems as marriage, roommate, or college-admission problems. JEL classication: C71, C78, D71
1 Introduction e nlyze simple olition formtion prolems in whih group of gents is prtitioned into olitions nd gents hve preferenes over the olitions they re memers ofF polE lowing the terminology proposed y hr eze nd qreenserg VD we fous on prolems hrterized y the hedoni4 spet of olition formtionF egents9 preferenes only depend on the identity of the memers of the olition to whih they elongF reneD we exlude the existene of externlities mong dierent olitionsF he most relevnt exmE ples of suh prolems re mthing prolems s the roommte prolemD or the formtion of soil lusD orgniztionsD tems or soietiesF he literture of golitionl qme heory hs extensively nlyzed the existene of stle prtitions in hedoni olition formtion prolemsF I snstedD we propose soE il hoie pprohF e study olition formtion rules tht ssoite to eh prole of gents9 preferenes prtition of the group of gentsF yur min onern is tht our rules stisfy strategy-proofnessF trtegyEproofness is the strongest deentrility propE ertyF ih gent needs to know only her own preferenes to ompute her est hoieF st is well known tht the requirements of strtegyEproofness re hrd to meetF sn the strt model of soil hoieD qird IH nd tterthwite IS show tht {provided there re more thn two lterntives t stke{ every strtegyEproof soil hoie rule is dittorilF roweverD resonle strtegyEproof rules do exist if pproprite restritions re imposed on gents9 preferenesF e fous on restrited domins of preferenes over olitions s the domin of dditively representle preferenes nd the domin of sepE rle preferenesD tht exlude omplementrities mong the memers of olitionF por these domins of preferenesD possiility results hve een otined in the litertureF por instneD in the ontext of group of gents hoosing suset from set of ojets @tht representD for instneD ndidtes who opt to some numer of ville positionsAD when gents9 preferenes over sets of ojets re dditively representleD then strtegyEproof rules n e deomposed into independent rulesD one for eh ojetF P fesides strtegyEproofnessD we would like our rule to stisfy three dditionl properE ties tht re nturl in the ontext of olition formtion prolemsF yur rules should e individually rational, non-bossy nd exibleF sndividul rtionlity is miniml prtiiE 1 For further references, see the recent works by Banerjee, Konishi, and S onmez [3] , Barber a and Gerber [4] , Bogomolnaia and Jackson [6] , and P apai [12] .
2 See Barber a, Sonnenschein, and Zhou [5] and Le Breton and Sen [11] for further details.
ption onstrintF st mens tht no gent should e ever worse o thn she would e in her ownF xonEossiness is ollusionEproof requirementF st sys tht if hnge in n gent9s preferenes does not et the olition to whih this gent is ssignedD then the remining gents re lso uneted y this hnge of preferenesF plexiility sys tht every prtition formed y olletion of fesile olitions elongs to the rnge of the ruleF por some gents to form olition is not neessry tht other olitions re lso formedF yur min result hrterizes fmily of rules tht fullls the previous xiomsD the fmily of singleElpping rulesF ingle lpping rules re hrterized y severe restriE tions over the set of fesile olitionsF yn the other hndD singleElpping rules lwys selet oreEstle prtitions of the soietyD in the sense tht no fesile olition of gents my unnimously prefer to join eh other rther thn to sty t the olition they re ssignedF reneD our min result provides further evidene on the reltion etween the xonEgoopertive qme heory onept of strtegyEproofness nd the goopertive qme heory onept of the oreF fefore proeeding with the forml nlysisD we review the most relted litertureF pi IP is losely relted to this workF his uthor nlyzes restritions over the set of fesile olitions tht ensure the existene of unique oreEstle prtitionsF he introE dues the singleElpping property nd shows tht the singleElpping property is suient ondition for unique oreEstilityF woreoverD it is lso shown tht singleElpping rules re the only rules tht stisfy strtegyEproofnessD individul rtionlityD nd wek version of eieny when gents9 preferenes over olitions re not restritedF yur theorems reE infore their resultsD sine we show thtD indeedD similr results lso hold in muh tighter domins of preferenesF pinllyD we refer to the works y ellde nd evill PD gehl rov nd omeroE wedin UD nd onmez IUF ell these works study strtegyEproof olition formtion rulesF roweverD they fous on dierent domins of preferenesF wore speillyD ellde nd evill PD gehl rov nd omeroEwedin U ssume tht gents9 preferenes over olitions re sed on the est or the worst group of gents in eh olitionF sn these environmentsD they prove the existene of strtegyEproof rules tht lwys selet oreE stle prtitionsF onmez IU proposes generl model of llotion of indivisile goods tht n e pplied to olition formtion prolemsF re fouses on preferene domins for whih there lwys exist oreEstle prtitionsF ris min result sttes tht there exist Q strtegyEproofD individully rtionlD nd reto eient rules only if the set of oreEstle prtitions is lwys essentilly singleEvluedF Q he reminder of the pper is orgnized s followsF sn etion PD we present the model nd si nottionF sn etion QD we present dierent gents9 domins of preferenes over olitionsF sn etion RD we introdue the min xioms while in etion SD we provide the hrteriztion resultsF sn etion TD we prove our min result @heorem IAF sn etion TD we onlude y nlyzing some pplitions of our result to dierent lsses of olition formtion prolemsF 2 Basic Notation vet N a fI; : : : ; ng e soiety onsisting of nite set of t lest Q gentsF e ll nonEempty suset C N coalitionF e denote y x the set of ll nonEempty susets of NF por eh C P xD let C ffig X i P CgF e collection of coalitions is set of olitions ¥ x tht ontins ll the singleton setsD N ¥F e denote y prtition of N nd y ¦ the set of ll prtitions of NF por eh i P N nd eh P ¦D we denote y i P the olition in to whih i elongsF por eh i P ND let g i a fC N; i P CgF ht isD g i is the set of ll olitions to whih i elongsF e preference for iD % i D is omplete order on g i F R por eh i P ND we denote y h i the set of ll gent is dmissile preferenesF es we ssume tht gents only re out the olition they elong toD gents9 preferenes over prtitions re ompletely dened y their preferenes over olitionsF henD using nottionD we sy tht for eh whileD F ' denotes the set of fesile olitionsD F ' fC P x; suh tht for some P R ' ; C P g:
3 Preferences over Coalitions: Rich Domains e strt y presenting two lsses of preferenes over sets tht ply ruil role in our nlysisF e ll them top preferences nd bottom preferencesF hese preferenes re otined y extending orders over single gents to preferenes over olitionsF he si ide ehind our preferenes over sets is tht ording to some order of the set of gentsD eh gent i divides the set of possile mtes into two groupsF hose gents tht she likesD nd those gents she dislikesF en gent equipped with top preferenes prioritizes joining the gents she likes the most with respet to voiding the gents she dislikesF yn the other hndD n gent equipped with ottom preferenes prioritizes voiding the gents she dislikes the most with respet to joining the gents she likesF sn order to present oth domins of preferenesD we introdue rst dditionl nottionF vet e the set of ll omplete orders over NF por eh P P D R denotes the wek order ssoited to P nd it is dened in the usul wyF por eh C N nd eh P P D we denote y mx@C; P A nd min@C; P AD respetivelyD the gents of C who re the rstErnked nd lstErnked gents y P F xextD for eh i P ND eh P P D nd eh C P g i D let C C i @PA fj P C; sFtF j R igD nd C i @PA fj P C sFtF i R jgF xowD dene C C i @I; P A mx@C C i ; P A nd C i @I; P A min@C i ; P AF yne C C i @t; P A nd C i @t; P A min@C i ; P A re dened for some t ! ID itertivelyD let Proof. st is wellEknown tht dditive preferenes re seprleF reneD we only prove the inlusion h £ i & e i F vet % i P h i e suh tht for some P P D % i a% C i @PAF vet t £ ft P N X i a N C i @t; P AgD nd " t n t £ F por eh j P N C i @PA n figD if j a N C i @k; P AD then let u i @jA a n n k D wheres for eh j H P N i @PA n iD if j H a N i @k H ; P AD then let u i @j H A a @n " t k I AF xowD let % H i P h i e suh % H i a% i @PAF por eh j P N C i @PA n figD if j a N C i @k; P AD then let u H i @jA a n t £ k I D wheres for eh j H P N i @PAniD if j H a N i @k H ; P AD then let u H i @j H A a @n n k AF he proof of @bA is just mtter of hekingF vet N a fi; j; kgF xote tht h £ i ; e i nd i onsist of the following eight preferenesX 
Axioms his setion introdues four properties tht rules my stisfyF vet "
h h e rtesin dominF vet ' X " h 3 ¦ e rule dened on " hF yur min xiom is n inentive onstrintF e rule should provide inentives for the gents to report their true preferenesF ynly if rule eliits the true preferenes from the gents the soil hoie will e sed upon the orret informtionF yf ourseD this property refers to the spei domin in whih the rule is denedF Strategy-Proofness. For each i P N, each %P " h, and each % H i P " h i , ' i @%A % i ' i @% i ; % H i A.
Conversely, ' is manipulable if ' is not strategy-proof in " hF he qirdEtterthwite heorem sttes tht every strategy-proof rule on n unE restrited domin either is dittoril or its rnge ontins only two elementsF S es we ssume tht gents9 preferenes over soil outomes re restrited to depend only on the olitions they re memers of nd we fous on rih dominsD the negtive onsequenes of the qirdEtterthwite heorem do not pply to our frmeworkF e lso onsider miniml prtiiption onstrintF egents should not prefer to sty on their own rther thn to elong to the olition tht the rule ssigns themF Individual RationalityF por eh i P N nd eh %P " hD ' i @%A % i figF xote thtD for every individually rational ruleD its set of fesile llotions is olleE tion of olitionsF e onsider rules suh tht whenever hnge in n gent9s preferene does not hnge the olition she is ssigned toD then the ssignment for the remining gents does not hngeF Non-BossinessF por eh i P ND eh %P " hD nd eh % i P " h i D ' i @%A a ' i @% i ; % H i A implies '@%A a '@% i ; % H i AF elthough in our model there does not exist ny trnsferle privte goodD we n interpret non-bossiness s ollusionEproof or rieEproof onditionF e violtion of its 5 A rule dened in the domain h is dictatorial if there is i P N (a dictator) such that for each %P h, ' i (%) = top(F ' ; % i ) .
V requirements implies possiility of ollusionF en gent might misrepresent her preferE enes in exhnge for trnsfer @of privte goodA from those who enet from her lieF e lso introdue miniml exiility ondition on the rnge of the ruleF e ssume tht the rnge of rule is determined y the set of fesile olitionsF FlexibilityF por eh a fC I ; : : : ; C m g P ¦D C t P F ' for eh t a I; : : : ; mD implies P R ' F Flexibility is mild onditionF st does not ssume the fesiility of ny olition nd it does not restrit signitively the rnge of pplitions of our modelF st voids interdependene mong olitionsF elthough in prinipleD we re not interested in eienyD we inlude now miniml eieny requirementF Pareto Eciency (on the Range)F here is no P R ' suh tht for eh i P N i % i ' i @%AD nd for some j P ND j 1 j ' j @%AF 5 Characterization Results sn this setion we nlyze the implitions of the xioms listed ove over rules dened on rih dominsF pirstD we introdue dditionl nottion due to pi IPF his uthor proposes property over sets of olitions { the singleElpping property{ tht ensures the existene of unique core-stable prtition for every preferene proleF e mke use of this property to dene lss of rulesF e olletion of olitions ¥ stises the single-lapping property if
Condition (a): por eh C; C H P ¥D C T a C H implies 5@C C H A IF Condition (b): por eh fC I ; : : : ; C m g ¥ with m ! Q nd for eh t a I; : : : ; mD 5@C t C tCI A ! I @where m C I a IAD there is i P N suh tht for eh t a I; : : : ; mD C t C tCI a figF Condition (a) sttes tht if there is n overlp etween ny two olitions in the olletionD there nnot e more thn one gent who is memer of these two olitionsF Condition (b) is nonEyle onditionF st requires tht if set of olitions in the olletion form yle in whih every two neighor olitions hve ommon memerD then ll these olitions hve the sme ommon memerF e prominent property of singleElpping olletion of olitions is tht for every preferene proleD there is olition in the olletion suh tht ll its memers think tht this olition is the est olition in the olletionF T his ft implies tht for every singleElpping olletion of olitions nd every preferene prole there is unique core-stable prtition of the soietyF woreoverD pi IP lso shows tht the singleElpping property is neessry ondition for the existene of unique core-stable prtition when gents9 preferenes over olitions re unrestritedF purthermoreD she lso presents the following lgorithm tht llows us to nd suh prtitionF por eh %P h £ nd eh singleElpping olletion of olitions ¥ & xD the corestable partition associated to ¥ at prole %, " ¥ @%A, n e identied y the following lgorithmX Algorithm: P apai [12] pind C P ¥ suh tht for eh i P CD top@¥; % i A a C F es ¥ is singleElppingD suh olition existsF xote tht there my e severl suh olitionsD nd ll these olitions re disjointF vet M ¥ @I; %A denote the set of ll olitions tht re otined in this rst stgeF vet ¥@I; %A ¥F vet T ¥ @I; %A denote the set of gents tht re mthed in the rst stgeF henD M ¥ @I; %A fC P ¥ suh tht for eh i P C; top@¥; % i A a Cg T ¥ @I; %A CPM ¥ @I;%A C yne ¥@t; %A; M ¥ @t; %AD nd T ¥ @t; %A re dened for some t ! ID letD ¥@t C I; %A fC P ¥ suh tht C T ¥ t a f?gg; M ¥ @t C I; %A fC P ¥@t C I; %A suh tht for eh i P C; top@¥@t C I; %A; % i A a Cg ndD T ¥ @t C I; %A CPM ¥ @I;%A:::M ¥ @tCI;%A C: xote thtD for eh t a I; : : : ; mD ¥@t; %A & ¥D ¥@t; %A is olletion of oliE tions for the redued soiety N n T ¥ @t; %AF woreoverD ¥@t; %A stises the singleE lpping propertyF henD the lgorithm identies unique prtitionD " ¥ @%A fC P h h be a rich domain of preferences. If the rule ' dened on " h is a single-lapping rule, then ' satises strategy-proofness, individual rationality, nonbossiness, and exibility.
Proof. vet F ' a ¥F es ' is singleElpping ruleD ¥ is singleElpping olletion of olitionsF vet us hek tht ' stises strategy-proofnessF vet %P " hF por eh i P T ¥ @I; %AD ' i @%A a top@¥; % i AF henD gents in T ¥ @I; %A nnot mnipulteF woreoverD y the denition of singleElpping rule for eh % H P " h suh tht for eh i P T ¥ @I; %A % i a% H i D ' i @%A a ' i @% H AF xowD let j P T ¥ @P; %AF sf there exists C P ¥ suh tht C 1 j ' j @%AD then there is i P T ¥ @I; %AA suh tht i P CF es for eh % H j P " h j D for eh i P T ¥ @I; %AD ' i @% Nnfjg ; % H j A a T ¥ @I; %AD ' j @%A % j ' j @% Nnfjg ; % H j AD nd j nnot mnipulteF epeting itertively the rgument with the remining steps of the lgorithmD we otin tht no gent n mnipulteF vet us hek tht ' stises individual rationalityF fy the denition of singleElpping ruleD for eh i P N nd eh %P " hD there is t n suh tht ' i @%A P M ¥ @t; %AF xote tht fig P ¥@t xextD we present our min resultF e prove tht even if we restrit drmtilly the domin of dmissile preferenes nd we fous on the smllest rih dominD singleElpping rules re the only rules tht stisfy our list of xiomsF Theorem 2. Let ' X h £ 3 ¦. If ' satises strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and exibility then ' is a single-lapping rule.
Proof. ee etion SF he intuition ehind the proof of heorem P runs s followsF pirstD for every rule tht stises our xiomsD whenever fesile olition of individuls grees tht they re the est olition villeD they should eome togetherF he result follows immeditely one we hek tht the set of fesile olitions stises the singleElpping propertyF his step is fr from eing immediteD lthough the nlysis is reltively simple for three gents soietiesF en indution rgument extends the results to ritrry soietiesF prom roposition I nd heorem PD we otin the following hrteriztion theoremF Theorem 3. A rule ' dened on a rich domain of preferences satises strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and exibility if and only if ' is a single-lapping rule.
et this pointD we hve to relte our results those y onmez IUF hey re logilly inE dependentD ut ll highlight the lose reltion etween the onepts of strategy-proofness nd core-stabilityF onmez IU proves tht for olition formtion prolems for whih there is lwys oreEstle prtitionD there is rule tht stises strategy-proofnessD individual rationalityD nd Pareto ecient if there is lwys unique oreEstle prtiE tionF U fesides the dierent set of xioms tht we nlyzeD the min dierene etween our frmework nd onmez9s one relies on the domin of preferenes over olitionsF onmez 7 Takayima [18] shows that in fact the converse result is also true.
IU ssumes the existene of ertin preferenes tht need not to exist on rih dominF fsillyD onmez IU ssumes tht for eh i P ND nd eh A P @F ' ihness is severe restrition on the domin of dmissile preferenesF his ft mkes our negtive result strongerF imilr results hold for other plusile domins of preferenes s the domins of dditively representle or seprle preferenesF henD we n stte the following resultF Corollary 1. Let' X e 3 ¦. Then,' satises strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and exibility if and only if' is a single-lapping rule.
Corollary 2. Let' X 3 ¦. Then,' satises strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and exibility if and only if' is a single-lapping rule.
heorems P nd Q re tight if there re t lest four gentsF hen there re only three gentsD exibility is diretly implied y individual rationalityF he following exmples show the independene of the xiomsF Example 1 @Strategy-proofnessA. For each i P N and each %P h £ , let IR i @%A fC P g i ; such that for each j P C; C % j fjgg : It is immediate to check that ' F satises individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. However, ' R violates exibility.
6 Proof of Theorem 2 e egin this setion y introduing some properties tht re implied y our xiomsF hese properties inorporte the ide tht rule nnot e ginst the preferenes of the memers of the soietyF hen there is prtition tht eh gent onsiders t lest s good s every other prtitionD rule should hoose tht estEpreferred prtitionF e 9 In order to check that ' NB violates non-bossiness, let %P e, % H k P e k be such that fi; jg 1 i fig,  fi stronger requirement would e tht whenever the memers of olition onsider this olition s the est olitionD rule should llow them to joinD independently of the preferenes of the remining gents in soietyF Unanimity (on the Range). vet a fC I ; : : : ; C m g P ¦ e suh tht for eh t a I; : : : ; mD C t P F ' F por eh %P h £ D eh t a I; : : : ; mD nd eh i P C t D top@F ' ; % i A a C t implies '@%A a F Top-Coalition (on the Range). vet C P F ' nd %P h £ F sf for eh i P CD top@F ' ; % i A a C D then for eh i P CD ' i @%A a CF st is ler tht top-coalition implies unanimityF xote tht top-coalition is property of rulesF fnerjee et al. Q use the term topEolition to nme property of preferene prolesF hese uthors sy tht preferene prole stises the topEolition property if for every group of gents V N there is olition C V tht is mutully the est for ll the memers of CF fsillyD our top-coalition implies tht if preferene prole stises the fnerjee et al.9s topEolition propertyD then the rule selets prtition in whih the olition tht ll its memers onsider tht olition s the est is formedF Lemma 1. Let ' X h £ 3 ¦ satisfy strategy-proofness non-bossiness, and exibility.
Then, ' satises unanimity.
Proof. vet a fC I ; : : : ; C m g P ¦ e suh tht for eh t a I; : : : ; mD C t P F ' F vet %P h £ e suh tht for eh t a I; : : : ; t nd eh i P C t D top@F ' ; % i A a C t F fy exibilityD P R ' F henD there is % H P h £ D suh tht '@% H A a F vet i P NF vet % HH P e e suh tht % HH i a% i while for eh j P N n figD % HH j a% H j F fy strategy-proofnessD ' i @% H Nnfi ; % i A % i ' i @% H A a top@F ' ; % i AF henD ' i @% H Nnfi ; % i A a ' i @% H A a top@F ' ; % i AF fy non-bossinessD '@% H Nnfi ; % i A a '@% H AF epeting the rgument s mny times s neessryD we otin '@%A a '@% H AF Lemma 2. Let ' X h £ 3 ¦ satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and exibility. Then, ' satises top-coalition.
Proof. vet C P F ' F vet %P h £ e suh tht for eh i P CD top@F ' ; % i A a CF sf 5C a ID the result follows from individual rationalityF sf C a ND the result is immedite y unanimityF vet % H P h £ e suh tht for eh i P CD top@F ' sn the following lemm we prove tht gents9 preferenes over unfesile olitions re irrelevnt for the soil hoieF Lemma 3. Let ' X h £ 3 ¦ satisfy strategy-proofness and non-bossiness. Then, for each %; % H P h £ such that for each i P N, and each C; C H P @F ' g i A, C 1 i C H if and only if C 1 H i C H , '@%A a '@% H A.
Proof. vet %; % H P h £ e suh tht for eh eh i P ND nd eh C; C H P @F ' g i AD C 1 i C H if nd only if C 1 H i C H F vet i P NF fy strategy-proofnessD ' i @% Nnfig ; % H i A % H i ' i @%A nd ' i @%A % i ' i @% Nnfig ; % H i AF henD s for eh C; C H P @F ' g i AD C 1 i C H if nd only if C 1 H i C H D ' i @%A a ' i @% Nnfig ; % H i AF fy non-bossinessD '@%A a '@% Nnfig ; % H i AF epeting the rgument s mny times s neessryD we get '@%A a '@% H AF he following lemm presents the ruil step in the proof of heorem PF Lemma 4. Let ' X h £ 3 ¦ satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and exibility. Then, F ' satises the single-lapping property.
Proof. he proof is y indution on the numer of gentsF e rst fous on threeEgent soietiesF henD we extend the result to ritrry soietiesF Claim 1. vet n a QD then F ' stises Condition (a) of the singleElpping propertyF vet N a fi; j; kgF essume to the ontrry tht F ' does not stisfy Condition (a)F henD there re C; C H P F ' suh tht 5@C C H A ! PF e hve two sesF Case (a.1 )X F ' a ffig; fjg; fkg; fi; jg; fi; j; kggF '@% Nnfig ; % H i A a @fi; kg; fjgAF fy strategy-proofnessD ' i @%A 1 i '@% Nnfig ; % H i AF henD we hve tht ' i @%A T a figF sing prllel rgumentsD we get ' j @%A T a fjg nd ' k @%A T a fkgD whih ontrdits @BA nd onludes the proof of glim PF xowD we extend the result to ritrry nite soietiesF Induction
Step. here is m ! Q suh tht for eh n mD if the nEgent rule ' stises strategy-proofnessD individual rationalityD non-bossinessD nd exibilityD then F ' stises the singleElpping propertyF xow we prove this is true for n a m C IF fy glims I nd PD the indution hypothesis is true for n QF @sf n a I; P the singleElpping property trivilly holdsFA vet n a m C IF essume tht ' stises strategyproofnessD individual rationalityD non-bossinessD nd exibilityF pirstD we prove two ftsF Fact 1. por eh C; C H P F ' suh tht C C H T a ND 5@C C H A a IF vet C; C H P F ' suh tht @CC H A T a NF vet j P N n@CC H AF vet " % j P h £ j e suh tht for eh C P g j D C T a fjgD fjg " 1 j CF vet ¦ Nnfjg denote ll the prtitions of the redued soiety N n fjgF hene the rule " ' Nnfjg X h £ Nnfjg 3 ¦ Nnfjg F vet "
' Nnfjg e suh tht for eh % Nnfjg D @ " ' Nnfjg @% Nnfjg A; fjgA '@% Nnfjg ; " % j AF fy '9s strategy-proofnessD individual rationalityD non-bossinessD nd exibilityD " ' Nnfjg stises strategy-proofnessD individual rationalityD non-bossinessD nd exibilityF fy the indution hypothesisD F " ' Nnfjg stises the single-lapping propertyF fy '9s exibilityD C; C H P F " ' Nnfjg D then 5@C C H A a IF ith similr rgumentsD we n lso prove the following ftF Fact 2. por eh fC I ; : : : ; C m g ¥ with m ! QD m taI C t T a ND nd for eh t a I; : : : ; mD 5@C t C tCI A ! I @where m C I a IAD there is i P N suh tht for eh t a I; : : : ; mD C t C tCI a figF Claim 1 H . F ' stises Condition (a)F essumeD to the ontrryD tht there re C; C H P F ' suh tht @C C H A a ND nd 5@C C H A ! PF here re three sesX Case (a:H H ) is dictatorialD whihD y n lredy fmilir rgumentD violtes '9s individual rationalityF Case (a:I H ) vet C H a ND nd for some i P C there is j P N n CD C HH & ND suh tht fi; jg C HH P F ' F xote rst thtD y pt ID for eh C HH P @F ' n NAD 5@C C HH A IF woreoverD y pt PD there is no yle of three olitions in F ' tht does not involve the grnd olition NF vet T N n CF vet j P C e suh tht there is "
T T suh tht " T fjg P F ' F xote tht y pt ID for eh T H T with @T H fjgA P F ' D @ "
T T H A a f?gF vet " C @C nfjgAF essume tht C; N P F ' D nd lso there is j P C suh tht for some T N n CD T fjg P F ' F xote thtD y pt ID if T H P F ' n CD then neither there is i P C n fjgD suh tht fi; jg T H D nor there is k P T suh tht fi; kg T H F vet " C C n fjgF sn this stepD we simply replite the rguments of gse @a:PAF vet % I P h £ e suh tht for eh i P " pinllyD let % T P h £ D e suh tht for eh % U C a% R C D while % T NnC a% S NnC F ht isD we only hnge gent j9s preferenes with respet to the previous proleF fy strategyproofnessD ' j @% T A % T ' T @% S a NF fy individual rationalityD for eh i P " CDif j P ' i @% T AD then ' i @% T A a NF reneD '@% T A a NF xote now tht % T only diers from % R in the preferenes of the gents who elong to N n CF vet k P N n T F fy strategy-proofnessD ' k @% T Nnfkg ; % R k A % R k ' k @% T A a NF henD j P ' k @% T Nnfkg ; % R k AF fy individual rationalityD there is i P " C suh tht i P ' j @% T Nnfkg ; % R k AF fy pt ID nd our ssumptions over F ' D '@% T Nnfkg ; % R k A a NF epeting the rgument s mny times s neessryD we get tht 10 Note that for each i P C, N is the only coalition in F ' that is preferred to staying on her own. On the other hand, for agent j, the coalitions that are preferred to staying alone include some member of C. Thus, j also stays alone. Finally, each agent k P N n C requires the presence of agent j in order to be happy about joining any given coalition. he mrrige prolems re speil lss of olition formtion prolemsF here re two disjoint groups of gentsF II hese two sets re usully interpreted s set of men nd set of womenF ih mn hs preferenes over women nd remining singleD nd eh womn hs preferenes over men nd remining singleF e olition is fesile if it onsists of ouple formed y mn nd womnD or it is formed y single gentF henD we sy tht rule ' m is dened over sulss of mrrige prolems ifD there re two disjoint sets of gents M; W D M W a N suh tht glerlyD if 5M ! P nd 5W ! PD the set of fesile olitions of rule dened on sulss of mrrige prolems does not stisfy the singleElpping propertyF xote thtD dditive representility of gents9 preferenes does not introdue ny restrition on the rnking of ouplesF woreoverD from vemm QD we know tht the hoie of rule stisfying our xioms is not eted y hnges on the preferenes over unfesile olitionsF henD from heorem ID we n derive immeditely the following orollryF Corollary 3. There is no rule dened on the class of marriage problems with at least two men and two women that satises strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and exibility. IP he only possiility to void the impossiility onsists of reduing the set of fesile olitionsD in suh wy tht not every ouple is fesileF ht would e the se when the set of men @or womenA is singletonF e generliztion of mrrige prolems is known s roommate problemsF here is set of gents tht hve to e orgnized in ouplesF por instneD there re numer of rooms ville nd we n ssign either I or P persons to eh roomF @ome room my remin emptyFA henD we sy tht rule ' r is dened over the lss of roommte prolems if F ' r a fC P x; 5C Pg:
Corollary 4. There is no rule dened on the class of roommate problems that satises strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and exibility.
yf ourseD gorollry P n e extended to prolems for whih lrger olitions re dE missileF roweverD in tht seD the result only holds if gents9 preferenes over roommte re dditively representleF 7.2 College Admission Problems when Students Care about Classmates enother generliztion of the mrrige prolem is known s the ollege dmission prolemF here re two disjoint sets of gentsD set of olleges CD nd set of new students SF ih ollege c P C my dmit up to q c new studentsF golleges hve dditively representle preferenes over new studentsF xew students hve dditively representle preferenes over olleges nd lssmtesF e olition is fesile if nd only if either is singleton or it ontins extly one ollege nd the numer of students ssigned to eh ollege is not lrger thn its respetive quot q c F hutt nd wss o W hve shown tht oreEstle prtitions my fil to exist in suh prolems when students my re out the identity of their lssmtesF e sy rule ' c is dened on the ollege dmission prolem where 12 Alcalde and Barber a [1], Roth [13] , and S onmez [17] show that for the marriage problem, no rule satises strategy-proofness, individual rationality, exibility, and Pareto eciency. PR students re out lssmtes if there re two disjoint setsD C; SD C S a ND nd list of quots fq c g cPC D suh tht F ' c a f@c; S c A; c P C; S c S; nd 5S c q c g N:
Corollary 5. Assume that S ! P, and either 5C ! P or if C a fcg, q c ! P. Then, there is no rule dened on the class of college admission problems where students care about their classmates that satises strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and exibility.
xote tht the previous orollry only holds if students re out their lssmtesF sn ftD onmez IT shows tht if students only re out the ollege they ttendD nd eh ollege hs n unlimited numer of slotsD there is lwys unique oreEstle prtitionD nd the rule tht selets tht prtition stises strategy-proofnessD individual rationalityD nd Pareto 
